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THE IMPACT OF RECENT U.S. SUPREME COURT
PUNITIVE DAMAGES JURISPRUDENCE ON
OKLAHOMA'S PUNITIVE DAMAGES STATUTE AND
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
ANDREW C. JAYNE*

I. Introduction
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,' the U.S.
Supreme Court overturned a punitive damages award as "grossly excessive"
in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for only
the second time in the Court's history.2 Since the Court's decision in
Campbell, legal commentators have disagreed about the significance of the
opinion,3 and lower courts have struggled to apply Campbell in postverdict
reviews of punitive damages awards.4 An even more puzzling question left
open after Campbell concerns the degree of guidance a jury must be given
before it assesses punitive damages. This question of procedural due process

* Associate, Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Holeman, Brittingham, Gladd & Carwile, Tulsa,
Oklahoma. B.A., Westminster College, 1999; J.D., University of Oklahoma, 2002. Articles
Editor, Oklahoma Law Review, 2001-2002.
1. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
2. The U.S. Supreme Court first overturned a punitive damage award under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in BMWofNorth America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S.
559 (1996).
3. Compare Mark Bonino, The U.S. Supreme CourtandPunitive Damages: On the Road
to Reform: After Years of Developing Its Jurisprudence,the Supreme Court in State Farm
Signals that the Days of Runaway, IrrationalPunitive Damages May Be Ending, 70 DE.
CouNs. J. 432,432 (2003) (stating that, in Campbell, the U.S. Supreme Court has signaled that
it intends to limit, if not eliminate, punitive damages), and Michael J. Brady, A New
Predictabilityin Punitive Damages?, FOR THE DEF., June 2003, at 10 (calling Campbell a
"momentous decision and victory for insurers, corporations, and wealthy individuals throughout
the land who face exposure to punitive damages"), with Larry Stewart, Constitutional
Requirementsfor Punitive Damages:Reality, Not Hyperbole - The Real Import of State Farm
v. Campbell, 78 FLA. B.J. 34, 34 (2004) ("Campbell is not a watershed decision but rather a
fact-bound application of existing precedent that did not fundamentally change the standards
the Supreme Court had established seven years earlier in [Gore].").
4. See, e.g., Don Willenburg, California Courts Are Struggling to Apply Reasonable
Limits on Punitive DamageAwards in Light of State Farm v. Campbell, L.A. LAW., June 2004,
at 22, 24-28; Steven L. Chanenson & John Y. Gotanda, The Foggy Road for Evaluating
Punitive Damages: Lifting the Haze from the BMW/State Farm Guideposts, 37 MICH. J. LAW
REFORM 441 (2004).
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has been largely neglected by the Supreme Court since its 1991 opinion in
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip.5
The Supreme Court's renewed interest in procedural due process and jury
instructions for punitive damages raises questions concerning the
constitutional sufficiency of Oklahoma's punitive damages statute and jury
instructions. Oklahoma's punitive damages statute6 provides the framework
for the Oklahoma Uniform Civil Jury Instructions dealing with punitive
damages. 7 This framework defines the type of conduct that may justify an
award of punitive damages, and incorporates escalating caps on the amount
of such damages, based on a list of factors a jury may consider in determining
the award. The framework differs significantly from both the punitive
damages statutes at issue in Campbell and Haslip and from the punitive
damages statutes currently in place in most states.8
This Article argues that Oklahoma's punitive damages statute and uniform
civil jury instructions relating to punitive damages provide more than
sufficient guidance to a jury presented with the option of imposing punitive
damages. Oklahoma's punitive damages framework adequately protects
against the concerns underlying the Supreme Court's punitive damages
jurisprudence. Although some additional safeguards may still be necessary,
in the vast majority of cases, Oklahoma's system for imposing punitive
damages will prevent a punitive damages award that could be rendered invalid
on postverdict review as grossly excessive in light of the substantive due
process limits discussed in Campbell.
Part 11 of this Article traces the line of U.S. Supreme Court cases leading
up to Campbell and analyzes the Campbell decision itself. This part focuses
on the Supreme Court's approval of very minimal jury instructions in Haslip
and the Court's return to procedural due process in Campbell. Part III
explains how Oklahoma's punitive damages statute and punitive damagesjury
instructions work together in civil cases. Next, Part IV analyzes the
constitutionality of Oklahoma's punitive damages statute andjury instructions
in light of Campbell and its predecessor cases. This part argues that

5. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
6. 23 OKLA. STAT. § 9.1 (Supp. 2003).
7. Oklahoma Uniform Civil Jury Instructions, nos. 5.6, 5.7 (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter

OUJI-CIV].
8. See Anthony J. Franze & Sheila B. Scheuerman, Instructing Juries on Punitive
Damages: Due ProcessRevisited After State Farm, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 423, 468-88 (2004)
(noting that while most jurisdictions take a minimalist approach to instructing a jury on the
imposition and amount of punitive damages, Oklahoma and Colorado are unique in
incorporating a statutory cap on punitive damages in their model instructions).
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Oklahoma's current punitive damages jury instructions provide
constitutionally sufficient guidance to a jury assessing whether to impose
punitive damages. Finally, Part IV discusses the changes that will have to be
made to Oklahoma's punitive damages procedure in light of Campbell's
discussion on the use of evidence of out-of-state conduct by the defendant in
other cases.
II. The Evolution of the Supreme Court's Punitive Damages Jurisprudence
The U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence involving substantive Fourteenth
Amendment due process limitations on punitive damages awards can be traced
back to the early twentieth century.9 These early cases, however, involved
civil statutory penalties rather than punitive damages awards assessed by a
jury.1 ° Supreme Courtjurisprudence specifically relating to due process limits
on punitive damages awards can only be traced back to the Court's 1989
decision in Browning-FerrisIndustries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc." In Browning-Ferris,a corporation challenged a $6 million punitive
damages award in an antitrust case under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive2
Fines Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment
does not apply to punitive damages awards in civil cases between private
parties. 3 The Court also held that the petitioner failed to properly preserve
the due process issue for appeal by failing to raise the issue before the district
court or the court of appeals and by failing to address the argument in its
petition of certiorari.14
While the Browning-Ferris Court found that the petitioner failed to
preserve its due process argument, the Court left open the possibility of a due
process challenge to a punitive damages award. The majority noted:
The parties agree that due process imposes some limits on jury
awards of punitive damages, and it is not disputed that a jury award

9. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453-54 (1993) (citing a
number of cases from the early twentieth century where the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment places substantive limits on the
amount of monetary penalties a state may impose).
10. See id.
11. 492 U.S. 257 (1989). The Browning-FerrisCourt considered as a matter of first
impression "whether due process acts as a check on undue jury discretion to award punitive
damages in the absence of any express statutory limit." Id. at 276-77.
12. Id. at 259-60.
13. Id. at 262-76.
14. Id. at 276-77.
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may not be upheld if it was the product of bias or passion, or if it
was reached in proceedings lacking the basic elements of
fundamental fairness. 5
Thus, Browning-Ferris opened the door for the Court's first substantive
review of a punitive damage award under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment less than two years later.
A. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip
In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, the Court addressed a
properly presented challenge to a punitive damages award under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Haslip, the plaintiffs
brought a fraud claim against their insurer, Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Company, after their insurer's agent misappropriated insurance premiums
and then concealed the fact that the plaintiffs had lost their coverage.' 6 The
Alabama jury awarded a lead plaintiff $200,000 in compensatory damages
and $840,000 in punitive damages. 17 After the Alabama Supreme Court
upheld the punitive damages award,' 8 Pacific Mutual appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court, and the Court granted certiorari.' 9
1. The Majority Opinion
The majority in Haslip began its review by noting that Alabama followed
the common law method for assessing punitive damages, in which "the
amount of the punitive award is initially determined by a jury instructed to
consider the gravity of the wrong and the need to deter similar wrongful
conduct."2 ° The HaslipCourt then pointed out that the "Court more than once
has approved the common law method for assessing punitive awards."'"
Given the long history of the Court's acceptance of the common law method
for assessing punitive damages, the HaslipCourt was unable to find "that the

15. Id. at 276. Justice Brennan's concurrence, which Justice Marshall joined, went a step
further. Justice Brennan wrote, "I join the Court's opinion on the understanding that it leaves
the door open for a holding that the Due Process Clause constrains the imposition of punitive
damages in civil cases brought by private parties." Id. at 280 (Brennan, J., concurring).
16. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1991).
17. Id. at 7 n.2.
18. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 553 So. 2d 537, 543 (Ala. 1989).
19. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990) (granting certiorari).
20. Haslip,499 U.S. at 15.
21. Id.
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common law method for assessing punitive damages is so inherently unfair as
to deny due process and be per se unconstitutional. 2 2
After approving the common law method for assessing punitive damages,
the HaslipCourt continued its analysis of the procedures used at the Alabama
trial court level. The Court initially voiced its continued concerns "about
punitive damages that 'run wild.', 3 The Court refused, however, to apply a
"bright-line" test for determining whether a particular punitive damages award
was unconstitutionally excessive.24 Instead, the Court preferred a general
reasonableness assessment. 25 With these principles in mind, the HaslipCourt
found that the jury instructions used in that case provided constitutionally
adequate guidance to the jury.26
Finally, the Haslip Court reviewed Alabama's postverdict procedure for
evaluating a punitive damages award. The Court found Alabama's procedure
sufficient to determine whether a particular award is greater than reasonably

22. Id. at 17.
23. Id. at 18.
24. See id.
25. Id. at 19-20.
26. The entirety of the instructions on punitive damages presented to thejury in Haslipread
as follows:
Now, if you find that fraud was perpetrated then in addition to compensatory
damages you may in your discretion, when I use the word discretion, I say you
don't have to even find fraud, you wouldn't have to, but you may, the law says
you may award an amount of money known as punitive damages.
This amount of money is awarded to the plaintiff but it is not to compensate
the plaintiff for any injury. It is to punish the defendant. Punitive means to punish
or it is also called exemplary damages, which means to make an example. So, if
you feel or not feel, but if you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the
plaintiff, whatever plaintiff you are talking about, has had a fraud perpetrated upon
them and as a direct result they were injured and in addition to compensatory
damages you may in your discretion award punitive damages.
Now, the purpose of awarding punitive or exemplary damages is to allow
money recovery to the plaintiffs, it does to the plaintiff, by way of punishment to
the defendant and for the added purpose of protecting the public by [deterring] the
defendant and others from doing such wrong in the future. Imposition of punitive
damages is entirely discretionary with the jury, that means you don't have to
award it unless this jury feels that you should do so.
Should you award punitive damages, in fixing the amount, you must take into
consideration the character and the degree of the wrong as shown by the evidence
and necessity of preventing similar wrong.
Id. at 6 n. 1. The Supreme Court found that these instructions "enlightened the jury as to the
punitive damages' nature and purpose, identified the damages as punishment for civil
wrongdoing of the kind involved, and explained that their imposition was not compulsory." Id.
at 19.
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necessary to punish the defendant and deter similar conduct.2 7 The majority
ultimately found that the jury instructions, along with the postverdict review
by the trial court and the Alabama Supreme Court, provided the defendant
with constitutionally sufficient due process.28
2. Justice O'Connor'sDissent
Justice O'Connor was the lone dissenting Justice in Haslip,arguing that the
common law procedures for awarding punitive damages used in Alabama
violated the procedural arm of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.29 Specifically, Justice O'Connor found that thejury instructions
used in Haslipwere constitutionally flawed and Alabama's postverdict review
could not cure the standardless discretion inherent in its punitive damages jury
instructions.30
First, Justice O'Connor took issue with an instruction characterizing the
award of punitive damages as "entirely discretionarywith the jury," not to be
made "unless this jury feels that you should do so."'" Justice O'Connor found
that "[i]nstead of reminding the jury that its decision must rest on a factual or
legal predicate, the instruction suggests that the jury may do whatever it
'feels' like. '3 2 Thus, for Justice O'Connor, Alabama's common law punitive
damages scheme would fail under a vagueness analysis.33
Justice O'Connor was equally critical of an instruction dealing with the
amount of punitive damages to assess, which stated, "Should you award
punitive damages, in fixing the amount, you must take into consideration the
character and the degree of the wrong as shown by the evidence and [the]
necessity of preventing similar wrong., 34 Justice O'Connor disagreed with the
majority's position that this statement sufficiently limited the jury's discretion
in fixing an amount of punitive damages.3
Justice O'Connor further indicated that postverdict review, no matter how
thorough, cannot cure a jury verdict tainted by passion or prejudice stemming
from a lack of guidance.3 6 While Justice O'Connor had no problem with the

27. Id. at 20-24.
28. Id. at 23-24.
29. See generally id. at 42-64 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 55-56 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 44 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 44-45 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
33. See id. at 45-46 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 48 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
35. Id. (finding that the instruction "restate[d] the overarching principles of punitive
damages awards - to punish and deter - without adding meaning to these terms").
36. Id. at 52 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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factors Alabama appellate courts examine when reviewing a punitive damages
award,37 she objected that the factors "play a role only after the jury rendered
its verdict" and thus, the factors could not "cure the vagueness of the jury
instructions."38
Second, Justice O'Connor explained that even if Alabama's common law
punitive damages scheme was not void for vagueness, the scheme still failed
the Supreme Court's balancing test for procedural due process.39 In Mathews
v. Eldridge,4° the Court set forth a "sliding-scale test for determining whether
a particular set of procedures was constitutionally adequate."4 1 Under this
test, the Court looks at "(1) the private interest at stake; (2) the risk that
existing procedures will wrongly impair this private interest, and the
likelihood that additional procedural safeguards can effect a cure; and (3) the
governmental interest in avoiding these additional procedures."42 Justice
O'Connor found that Alabama's procedures clearly deprived the defendants
43
of property without due process of law under the Mathews balancing test.
Of particular importance is Justice O'Connor's analysis of the second prong
of the Mathews balancing test, in which she focused heavily on the fact that
Alabama could easily remedy the procedural deficiencies in its common law
punitive damages scheme.' For example, the state could (1) provide the jury
with some or all of the factors the appellate courts considered when reviewing
a punitive damages award in the form of jury instructions; (2) legislate fixed
monetary limits for awards of punitive damages for particular types of
conduct; or (3) bifurcate trials into liability and punitive damages phases and
require clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with the
requisite culpability at the punitive damages stage.4 5 Justice O'Connor

37. See id. at 51-52 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.
2d 218, 223-24 (Ala. 1989) (setting forth factors for review)).
38. Id. at 52 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 53-60 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
40. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
41. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 53 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In analyzing the first prong of the Mathews
balancing test, Justice O'Connor found the private interest at stake to be substantial because "a
jury would not exceed its discretion under state law by imposing an award of punitive damages
that was deliberately calculated to bankrupt the defendant." Id.
44. Id. at 57 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 57-58 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor explained that bifurcating
punitive damages and liability stages and requiring "clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant acted with the requisite culpability" in the punitive damages stage would serve two
goals. Id. at 58 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). First, the clear and convincing standard would
constrain the jury's discretion and limit punitive damages to egregious cases only. Id. (citing
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explained that any of these procedures would provide more "meaningful
guidance to juries, thereby lessening the chance of arbitrary and
discriminatory awards, without impairing the State's legitimate interest in
punishment and deterrence. "46 Out of concerns for "federalism" and "judicial
restraint," however, Justice O'Connor refrained from designating a particular
method that states must adopt.4 7
B. Post-Haslipand the Supreme Court's Focus on Substantive Due Process
After Haslip but before Campbell, the Court heard four additional
challenges to punitive damages awards under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 8 In these cases, however, the Court shifted its focus
from procedural to substantive due process.
In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,4 the Court made
explicit what it had hinted at two years earlier in Haslip ° - that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment places "substantive limits" on
the amount of punitive damages a jury may award.5 ' From this point forward,
the Court's jurisprudence in this area focused almost exclusively on
addressing substantive concerns and articulating a workable test for
postverdict review of a punitive damages award. 2 In turn, Haslip's
acceptance of minimal common law jury instructions became the benchmark
by which to judge jury instructions. 3

Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Punitive Damages,Due Process,and the Jury, 40 ALA. L. REV. 975, 99596 (1989)). It would also "permit closer scrutiny of the evidence by trial judges and reviewing
courts." Id. Second, "the higher evidentiary standard would signal to the jury that it should
have a high level of confidence in its factual findings before imposing punitive damages." Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424 (2001); BMW of N.
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994); TXO
Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
49. 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
50. See Franze & Scheuerman, supra note 8, at 440.
51. TXO, 509 U.S. at 453-55.
52. In Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994), the Court shifted its focus back
to procedural due process. However, the issue before the Court was whether Oregon's
prohibition against postverdict review of the amount of a punitive damages award violated
procedural due process. Id. at 418. The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that Oregon's
prohibition against postverdict review of the amount of punitive damages awards violated the
Fourteenth Amendment and remanded the case to the Oregon Supreme Court for further
proceedings. Id. at 435.
53. See Franze & Scheuerman, supra note 8, at 488-89.
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The Court further refined its substantive due process analysis of punitive
damages awards in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore.54 Gore articulated
three "guideposts" for lower courts to use in postverdict reviews, and struck
down a punitive damages award as unconstitutionally excessive for the first
time in the Court's history.55
The Gore Court also found that the jury's consideration of certain out-ofstate conduct by the defendant - which was not shown to be illegal in the
state in which it occurred and did not cause the injury at issue - was
constitutionally improper.5 6 Gore acknowledged that the amount of the award
is not the only basis for finding a punitive damages award offensive to the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but that punitive damages
awards based on improper considerations by the jury may also violate
substantive due process.5 7
Although the Gore Court did not approve of a jury's use of out-of-state
conduct by a defendant as a "multiplier in computing the amount of its
punitive sanction" - which had actually occurred with the jury in Gore58 the Court made it clear that out-of-state evidence may be used to assess the
need for punitive damages.59 Specifically, the Court found that out-of-state
conduct may be relevant to the "degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct."' Evidence that a defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of
conduct "while knowing or suspecting that it was unlawful would provide
relevant support for an argument that strong medicine is required to cure the
defendant's disrespect for the law.'
In Gore, the Court also articulated three guideposts courts should use
during postverdict review of a punitive damages award: (1) the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct; (2) the disparity between the

54. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
55. See id. at 574-86.
56. Id. at 568-74.
57. Id.; see also Franze & Scheuerman, supra note 8, at 468 ("Apart from the guideposts,
most courts ignored BMW's holding that a punitive award may violate due process not only if
its size is grossly excessive, but also if the award is based on improper considerations.").
58. The plaintiff had argued that a $4 million punitive damages verdict was reasonable in
light of the fact that BMW had sold nearly one thousand cars under the same circumstances in
other states, and the jury apparently accepted the plaintiff's punitive damages formula. Gore,
517 U.S. at 564. The Alabama Supreme Court, however, found the jury's approach flawed,
holding instead that a $2 million punitive damages award was appropriate and ordered a
remittitur in that amount. Id. at 567.
59. Id. at 574 n.21.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 576-77.
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actual or potential harm to the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and
(3) the disparity between the punitive damages award and civil or criminal
penalties imposed in comparable cases. 62 Though the Court still refused to
"draw a bright line marking the limits of a constitutionally acceptable punitive
damages award," after applying the three guideposts, the Court found that the
$2 million punitive damages award, as limited by the Alabama Supreme
Court,63 was "grossly excessive" in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 64
C. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell
Seven years later,65 in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell, the U.S. Supreme Court attempted to clarify questions raised by
lower courts in applying the Gore guideposts and address how lower courts
should treat evidence of a defendant's out-of-state conduct in punitive
damages situations. Within the Campbell Court's analysis of the jury's use
of out-of-state conduct, the Court also mandated that courts give particular
punitive damages jury instructions in certain circumstances.6 6 The Court's
mandate that particularjury instructions be given in certain cases is significant
in determining what instructions Oklahoma courts are required to give to
juries assessing punitive damages. It may also signal that the Court is going
to require more than the Haslipcommon law instructions in order to comply
with procedural due process.67
1. The Facts and ProceduralHistory of Campbell
The Campbell dispute arose out of a 1981 three-car wreck that occurred
when Mr. Campbell, who was accompanied by his wife in the passenger seat,
attempted to pass six vans traveling ahead of him on a two-way highway.6"
Todd Ospital, who was driving in the opposite direction, swerved onto the

62. Id. at 575.
63. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
64. Gore, 517 U.S. at 585-86.
65. Between Gore and Campbell, the Court rendered another significant opinion relating
to postverdict review of punitive damages awards. In Cooper Industries,Inc. v. Leatherman
Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001), the Court held that appellate courts should conduct de
novo review of punitive damages awards.
66. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,422 (2003); see also Franze
& Scheuerman, supra note 8, at 507-08.
67. See Franze & Scheuerman, supra note 8, at 507-08 (arguing that the Campbell Court's
requirement of an out-of-state conduct jury instruction suggests that the Supreme Court may
revisit the concepts of "adequate guidance" and "reasonableness" set forth in Haslip).
68. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1141 (Utah 2001).
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shoulder to avoid a head-on collision with Campbell, and in the process
collided with a vehicle driven by Robert Slusher.69 Ospital died in the crash,
and Slusher suffered serious and permanent injuries.70
Slusher brought a tort claim against the Campbells, who were insured by
State Farm, and against Ospital's estate. 7' Ospital's estate cross-claimed
against Campbell for wrongful death, and Campbell cross-claimed against
Ospital's estate for contribution.72
Despite evidence indicating that Campbell was at fault, State Farm refused
to settle the case and rejected several offers from Slusher and Ospital's estate
to settle for the policy limits. 73 Ultimately, the wrongful death and tort action
proceeded to trial, and the jury found Campbell entirely at fault, awarding
Slusher $135,000 and Ospital $50,849. 74
In 1989, the Utah Supreme Court denied State Farm's appeal in the
wrongful death and tort action, and State Farm finally paid the entire
75
judgment, including the excess above Campbell's policy limits.
Subsequently, Campbell filed suit against State Farm alleging insurance bad
faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.76
Campbell premised his bad faith claim on State Farm's failure to inform
him early on in the wrongful death and tort action that the evidence indicated
that he was at fault. 77 While Campbell had consistently maintained that he
was not at fault during the wrongful death and tort action, he explained during
the bad faith lawsuit that he would have agreed to settle the wrongful death
and tort action if State Farm had informed him of the overwhelming evidence
indicating his fault.78
The trial court initially granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm
because the insurer had ultimately paid the excess judgment. 79 The Utah
Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the bad faith and intentional infliction

69. Id.
70. Id. The Campbells were not injured in the collision. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. Before trial, Ospital's estate entered into a separate settlement with Slusher. Id. at
1142.
73. Id.
74. Id. These awards far exceeded the Campbells' $50,000 policy limits. Id. State Farm
initially told the Campbells that it would not pay the amount over policy limits and advised Mr.
Campbell that he "may want to put for sale signs on [his] property to get things moving." Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1140-43.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1142.
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of emotional distress claims could be premised on State Farm's unreasonable
delay in paying the excess judgment regardless of whether the judgment was
ultimately satisfied.8"
The trial court then bifurcated the proceedings into liability and damages
phases. 81 In the first phase, the jury found State Farm liable based on its
unreasonable refusal to settle when there was such a high likelihood of an
excess verdict.82 Before the damages phase, however, State Farm renewed its
prior motions in limine to exclude all evidence of its out-of-state conduct in
unrelated cases.8 3 The trial court denied these motions, and Campbell's
attorneys were allowed to present substantial evidence concerning State
Farm's "Performance, Planning and Review" or "PP&R" policy.' 4 Campbell's
counsel used this evidence to show a nationwide scheme by State Farm to cut
the costs of claims at the expense of its insureds.8 5 At least some of this
evidence included State Farm's handling of first-party claims that "bore no
relation to third-party automobile insurance claims, the type of claim
underlying the Campbells' complaint against the company."86
At the conclusion of the damages phase, the jury awarded the Campbells
$2.6 million in compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive
damages.87 The trial court then remitted the jury awards to $1 million in
compensatory damages and $25 million in punitive damages.88 Attempting to
apply Gore's three guideposts on appeal, and relying on the "extensive
evidence concerning the PP&R policy" and testimony concerning State
Farm's "massive wealth," the Utah Supreme Court reinstated the $145 million
punitive damages award.89
2. The Supreme Court'sConcerns About ProceduralDue Process
The U.S. Supreme Court began its analysis of the award in Campbell by
once again expressing concern over the lack of guidance given to juries
presented with the opportunity to impose punitive damages. The Court noted
that punitive damages serve the same purposes as criminal penalties, except

80. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 840 P.2d 130, 143 (Utah Ct. App. 1992),
cert. denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1992).
81. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 414 (2003).
82. Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1142-43.
83. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 414.
84. Id. at 414-15.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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"defendants subjected to punitive damages in civil cases have not been
accorded the protections applicable in a criminal proceeding."9 This lack of
procedural guidance, the Court reasoned, "pose[s] an acute danger of arbitrary
deprivation of property."9'
The Campbell Court indicated that its procedural due process concerns
were heightened because the jury was presented with "evidence that [had]
little bearing as to the amount of punitive damages that should be awarded,"
and "vague instructions ... [which did] little to aid the decisionmaker in its
task of assigning appropriate weight to evidence .... "92 After Campbell, the
type of evidence presented to the jury will be central to the Court's review of
procedural and substantive due process protections in any punitive damages
award.
3. Campbell's "Reprehensibility"Analysis
After expressing its general concerns about the lack of guidance the jury
received when assessing punitive damages, the Court moved on to its
substantive due process analysis employing the three guideposts articulated
in Gore.93 The Court began its analysis under the first guidepost - the degree
of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct. Under this guidepost,
courts should consider whether: (1) the harm caused was physical as opposed
to economic; (2) the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless
disregard for the health or safety of others; (3) the target of the conduct was
financially vulnerable; (4) the conduct involved repeated actions or was an
isolated incident; and (5) the harm was the result of intentional malice,
trickery, deceit, or mere accident.94 The Court explained that the "existence
of any one of these factors weighing in favor of a plaintiff may not be
sufficient to sustain a punitive damages award; and the absence of all of them
renders any award suspect."9 "
The Campbell Court then focused its analysis on the jury's reliance on
State Farm's out-of-state conduct and the Utah Supreme Court's reliance on
this same out-of-state conduct as the basis for approving the punitive damages
award, which had been reduced to $25 million. 96 The Court pointed out that
a substantial portion of the evidence presented to the jury during the punitive

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.at 417.
Id.
Id.at 418.
Id.at 418-29.
Id.at 418 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 576-77 (1996)).
Id.at 419.
Id. at 420.
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damages phase of the trial involved conduct by State Farm in other out-of97
state cases that had no similarity to the facts of the Campbell's claim.
Specifically, the Court noted that many of these instances involved first-party
claims that had no similarity to the third-party claim at issue in Campbell.98
As the Gore Court previously indicated, a state lacks a legitimate interest
in punishing lawful conduct committed in another state.99 Likewise, the
Campbell Court found that, in general, a state does not have a legitimate
interest in imposing punitive damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts
committed outside of the state."° The Campbell Court ultimately concluded
that the Utah Supreme Court's consideration of State Farm's out-of-state
conduct as part of the reprehensibility analysis was improper.'
The Court was careful not to foreclose the use of out-of-state conduct to
support a punitive damages claim in all circumstances.'0 2 Out-of-state conduct
may be used to show the "deliberateness or culpability" of a defendant's
action, or a pattern or practice of certain conduct. 3 This conduct must,
however, be similar to the conduct at issue in the lawsuit. Moreover, there
must be a nexus between the specific harm suffered by the plaintiff and the
out-of-state conduct that the plaintiff seeks to admit as evidence of the
defendant's culpability. 1°4 Further, if a plaintiff can establish the requisite
nexus between the particular facts of the case and the out-of-state conduct, the
jury "must be instructed . . . that it may not use evidence of out-of-state
conduct to punish a0 5defendant for action that was lawful in the jurisdiction
where it occurred."'
The Court's command that a jury be provided a particular instruction
significantly departs from the Court's prior punitive damages jurisprudence.
Campbellis the first case in which the U.S. Supreme Court required that states
provide a specific punitive damages jury instruction, other than the minimal
common law instructions that merely informed the jury of the nature and

97. Id. at 423-24.
98. Id.
99. Gore, 517 U.S. at 568-74.
100. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 421. The Due Process Clause, according to the Court, "does not
permit courts, in the calculation of punitive damages, to adjudicate the merits of [third] parties'
hypothetical claims against a defendant under the guise of the reprehensibility analysis ...
Id. at 423.
101. Id. at424.
102. Id. at 422-24.
103. Id. at 422; see also Gore, 517 U.S. at 574 n.21.
104. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 422-23.
105. Id. at 422 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 572-73).
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purpose for punitive damages. t °" While the Court previously noted its concern
with vague jury instructions, until Campbell, it had consistently maintained
that it would not require states to provide a particularjury instruction. 0 7 The
Campbell Court's departure from this philosophy signals that the Court might
be willing to reexamine its prior restraint and require states to provide
particular punitive damages jury instructions. 0 8
4. The Second Guidepost
The Court moved on to analyze the ratio between the harm or potential
harm to the plaintiff and the amount of the punitive damages award. The
Court renewed its previous refusal to "impose a bright-line ratio which a
punitive damages award cannot exceed."'" In dicta, however, the Court
referenced a constitutional limitation on the ratio between actual and punitive
damages, stating that, "[the Court's] jurisprudence and the principles it...
established demonstrate.. ., that, in practice, few awards exceeding a singledigit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages ...will satisfy due
process."'' 0 The Court explained that ratios "greater than those [it had]
previously upheld may comport with due process where 'a particularly
'l
egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages."" II
Subsequently, the Court found the punitive damages award in Campbell
unreasonable and disproportionate to the economic harm suffered by the
plaintiff." 2
5.The Third Guidepost
The Court did not expend much effort analyzing the punitive damages
award under the third Gore guidepost, which tests the disparity between the
punitive damages award and civil or criminal penalties imposed in comparable
cases. The Court recognized that in the past it had looked at criminal penalties
as well as civil penalties in comparable cases.' In Campbell, however, the

106. See Franze & Scheuerman, supra note 8, at 507-08.
107. See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424 (2001); Gore,
517 U.S. 559; Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance
Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
108. See Franze & Scheuerman, supra note 8, at 511-24.
109. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425.
110. Id.
111. Id. (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 582). "A higher ratio may also be justified in cases in
which the injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of noneconomic harm might have been
difficult to determine." Gore, 517 U.S. at 582.
112. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 427-28.
113. Id. at 428.
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Court noted that there was less utility in comparing civil penalties with
criminal penalties because a court may only impose criminal penalties after
the "heightened protections of a criminal trial have been observed.""' 4 In
terms of civil penalties, the Court held that a $10,000 penalty for fraud was
the only comparable civil penalty." 5 Ultimately, the Court found that such a
penalty could notjustify a $145 million punitive damages award.1 6 The Court
concluded that the punitive damages verdict failed all three of the Gore
guideposts and remanded the case."'
Before Campbell, the Court focused its attempts to limit excessive punitive
damages awards on the postverdict review of such awards under the
substantive due process rubric."' However, Campbell'spronouncement that
a court must give a jury a particular instruction regarding the use of out-ofstate conduct in other cases signals a synthesis of the Court's substantive and
procedural due process jurisprudence." 9 At a minimum, Campbell indicates
that the Court may further deviate from its historical hesitancy to impose
procedural due process requirements on the states with respect to punitive
damages. In light of this development, Oklahoma must reevaluate its
procedures for imposing punitive damages in civil cases.
III. Oklahoma's Punitive DamagesProcedure
A. Oklahoma's Punitive Damages Statute
Oklahoma's punitive damages statute is found at title 23, section 9.1 of the
Oklahoma Statutes.120 Section 9.1 governs when a court may award punitive
damages and sets limits on the amount of punitive damages a plaintiff can
121
recover by creating three separate categories of punitive damages caps.
These categories are based on the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct.
Thus, before the jury can decide whether to award punitive damages, it must
first make a finding as to the level of reprehensibility of the defendant's

114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424 (2001); BMW
of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994);
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
119. See Franze & Scheuerman, supra note 8, at 511-12.
120. 23 OKLA. STAT. § 9.1 (2001).
121. See id.
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conduct. This finding controls the amount of punitive damages the jury may
assess in the second stage of the proceedings. 2
For a plaintiff to recover any punitive damages under Category I, the jury
must find by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant "has been
guilty of reckless disregard for the rights of others" or "an insurer has
recklessly disregarded its duty to deal fairly and act in good faith with its
insureds."' 23 If the jury makes such a finding, it may then award punitive
damages after an award of actual damages has been made. 2 4 Category I
punitive damages are limited to the greater of $100,000 or the amount of
actual damages.25

For a plaintiff to recover Category II punitive damages, the jury must find
by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant "acted intentionally and
with malice towards others" or that an insurer "has intentionally and with
malice breached its duty to deal fairly and act in good faith with its
insured."'' 26 If the jury makes such a finding, it may then award the greater of
(1) $500,000, (2) twice the amount of actual damages, or (3) "the increased
financial benefit derived by the defendant or insurer as a direct result of the
conduct causing the injury to the plaintiff and other persons or entities. 1 27
Finally, Category 111 allows ajury to award an unlimited amount of punitive
damages in specific situations. 2 8' To award Category II punitive damages,
however, there must be two separate findings: one by the jury and one by the
trial judge. First, the jury must find that the defendant "acted intentionally
and with malice towards others" or that an insurer "has intentionally and with
malice breached its duty to deal fairly and act in good faith with its
insured."'129 Then, in a separate proceeding outside the presence of the jury,
the trial judge must make a finding on the record that "there is evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant or insurer acted intentionally
and with malice and engaged in conduct life-threatening to humans ....

,,131

Only after the jury and the trial judge make these separate findings is the jury

122. Id.
123. Id. § 9. 1(B). The text of section 9.1 deals with defendants in general and insurers in
particular. The language in the statute referring to the "insurer" is limited to bad faith lawsuits.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. § 9.1(C).
127. Id.
128. Id. § 9.1(D).
129. Id.
130. Id.
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allowed to award punitive damages without regard to the limitations set forth
under Categories I and l.31
In the second stage, after the jury has found that the defendant acted with
the requisite conduct and intent to qualify for either Category I, 11, or III
punitive damages, the jury is presented with the following list of factors to
consider when determining the amount of punitive damages to award:
The seriousness of the hazard to the public arising from the
defendant's misconduct;
The profitability of the misconduct to the defendant;
The duration of the misconduct and any concealment of it;
The degree of the defendant's awareness of the hazard and of its
excessiveness;
The attitude and conduct of the defendant upon discovery of the
misconduct or hazard;
In the case of a defendant which is a corporation or other entity,
the number and level of employees involved in causing or
concealing the misconduct; and
32
The financial condition of the defendant.
Section 9.1 explicitly provides that the jury must predicate any award made
under Category I, H,or III on this list of factors.

33

B. Oklahoma's Punitive Damages Jury Instructions- Stage One
The Oklahoma Uniform Civil Jury Instructions on punitive damages track
the procedures set forth in section 9.1."'4 The punitive damages jury
instruction given to Oklahoma juries in the first stage of the trial asks the jury
to make a finding regarding whether the defendant acted in reckless disregard
of the rights of others 35 or acted intentionally and with malice toward
others. 136 This jury instruction explicitly states that it is the plaintiff's burden
131. Id.
132. Id. § 9.1(A).
133. Id. § 9.1(E).
134. See OUJI-CIV, supra note 7, nos. 5.5, 5.6, 5.9. This article addresses the
constitutionality of section 9.1 and its corresponding jury instructions.
135. Reckless disregard for the rights of others occurs when the defendant "was either aware,
or did not care, that there was a substantial and unnecessary risk that [his] conduct would cause
serious injury to others." OUJI-CIV, supra note 7, no. 5.6. The defendant's conduct can only
be considered in reckless disregard of another's rights if it was "unreasonable under the
circumstances" and there was "a high probability that the conduct would cause serious harm to
another person." Id.
136. Malice "involves either hatred, spite, or ill-will, or else the doing of a wrongful act
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37
to make one or both of these showings by clear and convincing evidence.'
Finally, the instruction informs the jury that it cannot award punitive damages
without meeting this standard. 3 ' The first-stage verdict form then allows the
jury to indicate whether it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant acted in reckless disregard for the rights of others or whether the
39
defendant acted intentionally and with malice toward others.'

C. Oklahoma's Punitive DamagesJury Instructions- Stage Two
If the jury does not find by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant either recklessly disregarded the rights of others or acted
intentionally and with malice toward others, it cannot award punitive damages
and there is no second stage to the trial. If, however, the jury finds that the
defendant's conduct rose to one of these levels, the trial will proceed to the
second stage. The amount of punitive damages the jury may award is limited
by the jury's findings in the first stage."
The second-stage, punitive damages jury instruction begins by explaining
to the jury that the purpose of punitive damages is to punish the defendant and
to deter the defendant and others from similar conduct. 4 The instruction also
makes it clear, however, that the jury is not required to assess any punitive
damages, and any award of punitive damages must be based on sound
reason.' 42 Finally, the second-stage instruction lists eight factors the jury may
43 The instruction
consider in determining the amount of punitive damages.
permits the jury to award up to the amounts set by the caps in section 9.1.

intentionally without just cause or excuse." Id.
137. Clear and convincing evidence means "highly probable and free from serious doubt."
Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. no. 5.7.
140. 23 OKLA. STAT. § 9.1 (2001). Unless the plaintiff qualifies for uncapped punitive
damages under Category III, the punitive damages jury instruction given in the second stage
reflects the caps in Category I or H outlined in section 9.1. Id.
141. OUJI-CIV, supra note 7, no. 5.9.

142. Id.
143. The wording of these eight factors has been modified slightly from the seven factors
listed in section 9.1 so that they may be more easily understood by the jury. The substance of
the eight factors in this jury instruction, however, are identical to the seven factors listed in
section 9.1. See id.

144. Id.
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IV. The Impact of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell on Oklahoma'sPunitive Damages Statute and Jury Instructions
Oklahoma's punitive damages procedures meet the minimum standard set
forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Haslip.1 45 Indeed, Oklahoma has
incorporated all of the procedural safeguards suggested in Justice O'Connor's
dissent into its punitive damages regime.' 46 However, should the Court
conduct a more searching analysis of states' procedures for imposing punitive
damages, whether Oklahoma's punitive damages regime provides adequate
guidance to Oklahoma juries is unclear.
A. Bifurcation and a Clearand Convincing Standardof Proof
Oklahoma's framework for imposing punitive damages provides the jury
with factors to consider when contemplating whether to assess punitive
damages as well as several additional procedural safeguards to prevent
excessive and arbitrary awards.'4 7 Not only do these safeguards address the
procedural due process concerns noted by the Supreme Court throughout its
Fourteenth Amendment punitive damages jurisprudence, but they also
alleviate some of the substantive due process issues that the Court has
traditionally left to postverdict review.
For example, Oklahoma's punitive damages framework requires that courts
bifurcate the punitive damages portion of a trial into two stages. In the first
stage of a trial, the jury makes a determination on liability, actual damages,
and whether the defendant's conduct was sufficiently egregious to warrant any
punitive damages. The amount of punitive damages, if any, is determined in
a second stage proceeding that only occurs if the jury finds in the first stage
that the defendant is liable and that the defendant's conduct was sufficiently
reprehensible to warrant punitive damages.148 Oklahoma also requires the
plaintiff to show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's
conduct was sufficiently reprehensible to justify punitive damages.' 49
According to Justice O'Connor, requiring clear and convincing evidence that

145. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1991).
146. Justice O'Connor's proposal included (1) bifurcating trials into liability and punitive
damages stages; (2) requiring clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with the
requisite conduct to warrant punitive damages; (3) placing monetary maximums on awards of
punitive damages; and (4) providing the jury with a list of factors to consider when deliberating
the propriety of a punitive damages award. Id. at 57-58 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
147. See supra Part 11.
148. See supra Part III (fully discussing bifurcation).
149. 23 OKLA. STAT. § 9.1 (2001).
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the defendant acted with the requisite culpability not only constrains the jury's
discretion and limits punitive damages to the more egregious cases, it also
"signal[s] to the jury that it should have a high level of confidence in its
factual findings before imposing punitive damages."15
B. Oklahoma's Caps on Punitive Damages Help Alleviate the Court's
Concerns About Punitive DamagesAwards that Grossly Exceed the
Amount of Compensatory Damages
Oklahoma's caps on punitive damages are also one of the methods for
preventing excessive and arbitrary punitive damages awards suggested by
Justice O'Connor in Haslip.'5' The escalating caps under Oklahoma's
punitive damages statute ensure that the total dollar amount of any punitive
damages award reflects the level of culpability of the defendant's conduct as
required by the second guidepost in Gore.
Gore's second guidepost requires courts to examine the ratio between the
harm or potential harm to the plaintiff and the punitive damages award." 2
Although the Supreme Court in Campbell refused "to impose a bright-line
ratio which a punitive damages award cannot exceed,"' 53 the Court did state
that "few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process."'5 4
Under Oklahoma's punitive damages statute, the concern over punitive
damages awards that drastically exceed the amount of actual damages is
significantly limited because of the three categories limiting the amount of
punitive damages. For example, under Category I, the jury may not award
punitive damages in excess of the greater of $100,000 or the amount of actual
damages awarded.' 55 This limitation should, in most cases, prevent any
punitive damages award that is more than nine times greater than the amount
of compensatory damages awarded by the jury. The only way a Category I
award could exceed a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages would be a situation where actual damages were $10,000 or less and
the punitive damages award was close to the $100,000 maximum permitted
under Category I. While such an award would surpass the single-digit ratio

150. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 58 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

151. Id.
152. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,424 (2003) (citing BMW
of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996)).
153. Id. at 424-25 (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458

(1993)).
154. Id. at 425.
155. 23 OKLA. STAT. § 9.1(B) (2001).
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noted by the Campbell Court, there is a strong chance, given Oklahoma's
detailed punitive damages procedures, that such an award would fall into one
of the exceptions to the nine-to-one ratio described by the Supreme Court.
The Court in Campbellrecognized that there are cases where ratios greater
than those previously upheld by the Court may comport with due process.'5 6
These are generally cases where "a particularly egregious act has resulted in
only a small amount of economic damages" or where "the injury is hard to
detect or the monetary value of the non-economic harm might have been
difficult to determine."' 57 While a Category I punitive damages award could
exceed the nine-to-one ratio and thus warrant a reversal on appeal, appellate
courts should consider that Oklahoma has incorporated significant procedural
safeguards to prevent arbitrary and excessive punitive damages awards, and
evaluate whether the particular case is one that justifies an award of punitive
damages greater than nine times the actual damages.
The analysis of Category I punitive damages is similar in most cases.
Under Category II, a plaintiff may recover the greater of $500,000, twice the
amount of actual damages, or the increased financial benefit derived by the
defendant as a result of the conduct causing the injury to the plaintiff and
other persons or entities.'58 Unless the award is based on the increased
financial benefit to the defendant, the Category I analysis applies. When
dealing with Category II, the dollar limit on the amount of punitive damages
that may be awarded increases, as does the level of conduct that must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence. In most cases, twice the amount of
actual damages or $500,000 should not offend due process because in most
cases awards under this provision will not reach or exceed the nine-to-one
punitive damages to actual damages ratio.
As for awards based on the defendant's increased financial gain as a result
of the conduct causing harm to the plaintiff and others, this issue is more
complex. To the extent the award is based solely on the defendant's financial
gain from conduct causing harm to the plaintiff, the U.S. Supreme Court
would likely find that the award does not offend due process. Such an award
may be particularly appropriate in terms of realizing states' legitimate interests
in imposing punitive damages - retribution and deterrence. 9 When a
Category HI punitive damages award exceeds the compensatory damages
award by more than a single-digit ratio, the appellate court should consider

156.
157.
158.
159.

See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 424.
Id. (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 582).
23 OKLA. STAT. § 9.1(C).
See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 416.
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whether the facts and circumstances of the case warrant the exception
described in Campbell.
Additional due process concerns may be raised, however, if the cap under
a Category II award is based in whole or in part on the defendant's increased
financial gain resulting from similar conduct causing harm to persons other
than the plaintiff. Campbell's extensive language denouncing the use of outof-state conduct as a basis for a punitive damages award 160 would prohibit
relying on any such out-of-state conduct to set a cap under Category II because
it would likely violate the substantive aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause.
If a plaintiff could show similar conduct that took place in Oklahoma
causing injury to Oklahoma residents, however, such evidence probably could
be the basis for establishing a cap under Category II. Oklahoma has a
legitimate state interest in punishing its own residents for conduct taking place
within its borders. 16' As long as the conduct in issue was sufficiently similar
to the conduct causing harm to the plaintiff, caps based on the defendant's
financial gain from similar conduct taking place in Oklahoma and causing
injury to Oklahoma residents probably could be used to establish a Category
162
11 cap.
Category Hm removes the cap and allows the jury to impose an unlimited
award of punitive damages.1 63 Despite Oklahoma's procedural safeguards
concerning Category 11, 1" Oklahoma courts should not conclude that an
award by an Oklahoma jury under Category IRI is completely immune from
reduction given the strong language in Campbell condemning large punitive
awards. However, the evidentiary findings that the jury and trial judge must
make before the cap on punitive damages is lifted ensure that only the most
egregious cases fall within Category 11.
Category IH requires factual findings by the trial judge based on the
criminal system's burden of proof - beyond a reasonable doubt - before it
can lift the punitive damages caps. 165 This additional procedural hurdle of
requiring an evidentiary finding by the trial judge under the criminal burden
of proof seems to negate some of Campbell's strong skepticism of large
punitive damage awards.'66

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 419-24.
Id.
See id. at 422-24.
23 OKLA. STAT. § 9.1(D).
See supra Part III.A.
23 OKLA. STAT. § 9.1(D)(2).
Campbell, 538 U.S. at 417 (noting that punitive damages are not akin to criminal
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Overall, Oklahoma's three-category system for controlling punitive
damages, along with the bifurcation of the liability and punitive damages
stages and the increased burden of proof, provides Oklahomajuries with much
less discretion than the Utah jury in Campbell. Moreover, these procedural
mechanisms ensure that most punitive damages awards in Oklahoma are
rationally related to the actual damages award and unlimited awards are only
permitted in the most egregious cases. These procedural safeguards lend
legitimacy, fairness, and due process to Oklahomajuries' awards that were not
present in Campbell.
C. Whether the Factorsan Oklahoma Jury is Allowed to Consider When
Assessing the Amount of Punitive Damages to Impose Comply with the
Supreme Court'sPunitive Damages Jurisprudence
As explained previously, Oklahoma's second-stage, punitive damages jury
instruction provides a list of factors the jury may consider when determining
the amount of punitive damages to impose.'6 7 These factors all center on the
168
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct.
One factor, however, concerns the wealth of the defendant. 169 The idea that
a jury may only focus on the wealth of the defendant, particularly an out-ofstate defendant, has troubled the U.S. Supreme Court. More than once, the
Court has noted that "[t]he wealth of a defendant cannot justify an otherwise
unconstitutional punitive damages award."' 7 ° The Court has consistently
acknowledged, however, that presentation of evidence of a defendant's
financial wealth is not per se unconstitutional and may serve a legitimate
purpose in a jury's determination.' 7'
Oklahoma juries are instructed that they may not consider the financial
wealth of the defendant until after the jury has already made a determination

penalties because of the additional procedural safeguards present in criminal cases).
167. See supra note 132 and accompanying text; OUJI-CIV, supra note 7, no. 5.9.
168. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419 (listing factors such as whether (1) the harm caused was
physical as opposed to economic; (2) the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a
reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; (3) the target of the conduct was financially
vulnerable; (4) the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and (5) the
harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, deceit, or mere accident).
169. See 23 OKLA. STAT. § 9.1(A).
170. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 427 (Breyer, J., concurring).
171. Id. (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 591 (1996)) ("Since a fixed
dollar award will punish a poor person more than a wealthy one, one can understand the
relevance of this factor to the State's interest in retribution (though not necessarily to its interest
in deterrence, given the more distant relation between a defendant's wealth and its responses
to economic incentives).").
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about the level of the defendant's conduct. 7 2 Furthermore, the second-stage,
punitive damages jury instruction informs the jury that "the purpose of
punitive damages is to punish and not destroy a defendant."' 73 Taken together,
these instructions may actually cause a jury to decrease a punitive damages
award or bring an otherwise excessive award within constitutional limits.
D. The Use of Evidence of a Defendant's Out-of-State Conduct in Different
CasesAfter Campbell
The U.S. Supreme Court first admonished the use of a defendant's out-ofstate conduct in different cases to justify a punitive damages award in Gore.'74
Campbell reaffirmed this position, noting that "[a] State cannot punish a
defendant for conduct that may have been lawful where it occurred.' 7 5
Nevertheless, the Court did not place an absolute prohibition on the use of a
defendant's out-of-state conduct in other cases during a punitive damages
76

proceeding.1

If a plaintiff wants to use evidence of a defendant's acts in other
jurisdictions, however, the acts must be similar to the conduct at issue in the
present lawsuit. 77 Further, if a plaintiff admits evidence of similar out-ofstate conduct to show the deliberateness and culpability of the defendant's
actions, the trial court must instruct the jury that "it may not use evidence of
out-of-state conduct to punish a defendant for action that was lawful in the
178
jurisdiction where it occurred."'
Several of the factors presented to Oklahoma juries when considering the
amount of punitive damages could implicate out-of-state conduct. For
example, the defendant's out-of-state conduct in other cases could show the
defendant's awareness of its conduct, its consequences, and the hazard to the
public created by such conduct. 179 Similarly, out-of-state conduct in other
cases could also show the attitude and conduct of the defendant upon finding
out about its misconduct.'80 Finally, out-of-state conduct could also indicate
how long the conduct has lasted and the profitability of that misconduct.' 8 '
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173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See OUJI-CIV, supra note 7, no. 5.9.
Id.
Gore, 517 U.S. at 568-74.
Campbell, 538 U.S. at 421.
Id. at 423-24.
See id.
Id. at 422.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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V. Conclusion
The impact of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell
on Oklahoma's system for imposing punitive damages should be dramatically
less than in most other states because of the punitive damages procedures
Oklahoma had in place before the Campbelldecision. Oklahoma uses every
procedure recommended by Justice O'Connor in her dissent in Haslip to
ensure that Oklahoma juries do not violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment when punitive damages are imposed. These
procedures more than adequately protect against arbitrary and excessive
punitive damages awards in Oklahoma courts.
The greater impact of the Campbell decision on Oklahoma punitive
damages jurisprudence relates to the use of a defendant's out-of-state conduct
in other cases. First, the Court's language on this topic likely prevents
Oklahoma courts from using defendants' financial gain from similar out-ofstate conduct, whether lawful or unlawful, as a basis for creating a cap under
Category H1 punitive damages. To use the defendant's financial gain from its
out-of-state conduct to create a Category II punitive damages cap would likely
be considered punishing the defendant for conduct outside of the relevant
jurisdiction. Second, while a defendant's out-of-state conduct in other cases
is admissible to show the deliberateness and culpability of the defendant, such
evidence is only admissible if it is similar to the conduct at issue in the
lawsuit. Further, if a plaintiff admits evidence of the defendant's out-of-state
conduct in other cases to establish the deliberateness or culpability of the
defendant, the jury must be provided with an instruction explaining that it may
not use evidence of out-of-state conduct to punish the defendant for actions
that were lawful in the jurisdiction where it occurred.
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